Hierarchy in Mixed Relation Networks: Warfare Advantage and Resource Distribution in Simulated World-Systems

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Journal of Social Structure

International Network for Social Network Analysis

Subject: Social Sciences

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VOLUME 14 , ISSUE 1 (December 2013) > List of articles

Hierarchy in Mixed Relation Networks: Warfare Advantage and Resource Distribution in Simulated World-Systems

Jacob Apkarian * / Jesse B. Fletcher / Christopher Chase-Dunn / Robert A. Hanneman

Keywords : World-systems, networks, elementary theory, exclusion, demographics, warfare, migration, trade, simulation

Citation Information : Journal of Social Structure. Volume 14, Issue 1, Pages 1-17, DOI: https://doi.org/10.21307/joss-2019-023

License : (CC BY-NC 4.0)

Published Online: 14-August-2019

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ABSTRACT

Building on world-systems theory, simulation models of 5-line intersocietal networks were generated in an effort to understand systemic power hierarchies. The societal nodes were exclusively connected by three types of interaction: migration, warfare, and unequal trade. These networks can be considered “mixed relation” networks due to the ways in which these types of ties combine positive and negative sanction flows. Insights from elementary theory were employed to understand how exclusion from these different types of ties might influence the resulting power distributions. Additionally, the resource carrying capacity of the nodes was varied by structural position in an effort to differentiate the influence of structural position and individual attributes on location in the hierarchy. It was determined that exclusion from interaction is likely a structural, scale invariant mechanism that helps to determine power distributions above and beyond the inherent attributes of network actors.

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